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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate ~ uiis^- - -
this appea- ::.:.. r ]- - Lormal adjudicative 
proceeding before the Utah State 'J ax Commission pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. ,^.:-_.-. - Court has 
juj isdietion over this appeal pursuant to Jtah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-2 (2) •" x (2002) based on uiu iiaiibit-i ..|.l*r ..i i rj,:. 
J ,; reii:* • '-!.-•• -d November 5, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Was tnc- I.-; •*: ' ±11 finding Stevensc1. 
responsible person pursuant to Utah Code Ann. ..--,-
302(100-.., .... . " i to collect, 
account for, and pay over withholdino tax? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When • '-^HPWI ii'| formal administrative proceedings 
commenced before the commission, tnc LOU. ,»tr I 
SupxeiiiL Cuu i i : ' . 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning _ j 
written findings of fact, applying a substant"-1 
evidence standard on review; and grant the 
commission no deference concerning its conclusions 
of law, applying a correction of errox standard, 
1 
unless there is an explicit grant of discretion 
contained in a statute at issue before the 
appellate court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(a) and (b) (2000). 
II. Can Stevenson meet his burden of proof on appeal to 
show reasonable cause or insufficient evidence to 
reverse the Final Decision of the Tax Commission? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing formal administrative proceedings 
commenced before the commission, the Court of Appeals or 
Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its 
written findings of fact, applying a substantial 
evidence standard on review; and grant the 
commission no deference concerning its conclusions 
of law, applying a correction of error standard, 
unless there is an explicit grant of discretion 
contained in a statute at issue before the 
appellate court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(a) and (b) (2000). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 59-1-302(2000). 
(1) The provisions of this section apply to the 
following taxes in this title: . . . 
(g) withholding tax under Chapter 10, 
Part 4. 
2 
(2) Any person required to collect, t •hru!]y 
account for, and pay over any tax listed 
Subsection (1) who willfully fails to .-oilect the 
tax, fails to truthfully account for and pay over 
the tax, 01 attempts in any manner to evade or 
defeat any tax or the payment of the tax, shall be 
liable for a penalty equal to the total amount of 
the tax evaded, not collected, not accounted for, 
or not paid over. This penalty is in addition to 
other penalties provided by 1 a w 
(7) (b) It is prima facie evidence that a person 
has willfully failed to collect, truthfully 
account for, or pay over any of the taxes listed 
in Subsection (1) if the commission or a court 
finds that the person charged with the 
responsibility of collecting, accounting for, or 
paying over the taxes: 
(J) made a voluntary, conscious/ 
and intentional decision to 
prefer other creditors over the 
state government or utilize the 
tax money for personal purposes; 
(i i) recklessly disregarded 
obvious or known risks, which 
resulted in the failure to 
collect, account for, or pay 
over the tax; or 
(iii) failed to investigate ;i 
to correct mismanagement, having 
notice that the tax was noi or-
is not being collected, 
accounted for, or paid uvei i 
provided ^-'~ 1 .:w . 
- commission or court need not find 
3 
a bad motive or specific intent to 
defraud the government or deprive it of 
revenue to establish willfulness under 
this section. 
26 U.S.C. § 6672 FAILURE TO COLLECT AND PAY OVER TAX, OR 
ATTEMPT TO EVADE OR DEFEAT TAX 
(a) General Rule- Any person required to collect, 
truthfully account for, and pay over any tax 
imposed by this title who willfully fails to 
collect such tax, or truthfully account for and 
pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any 
manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the 
payment thereof, shall, in addition to other 
penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty 
equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or 
not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
This case is an appeal by Mr. Eric Stevenson of a Utah 
State Tax Commission Final Decision dated August 18, 2003. 
(R. 3-9.) attached as an Addendum to Appellant's Brief, 
"Final Decision of the Tax Commission." On May 13, 2002, 
the Taxpayer Services Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission notified Stevenson of a preliminary assessment of 
a personal non-payment penalty. (R. 217.) A Statutory 
Notice of the assessment in the amount of $12,018.04 was 
4 
sent on .^ Ua . .._ , ' 1 °. ' On August 0, 2002, 
^rpvenson filed a Petition for Redetermination., requtb 
hearing on this matter Oi l August t, 2003, 
i lorn..:. TO:--::— took place before the Commission regaic-..: 
Stevenson's petition ,nrission issued 
- ~~ . :. : Conclusions c: Lav;, io Final De^sion 
on August 18, 2 01M, which aftirme . n:i • u o 
persona: . • . . "•^smpnt. (R. 3-9. ':evenson filed an 
appeal of this decision of September 1 ; , 
. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
T'^—^ Communication^, Inc Tltah corporation 
organized : :: 1 oor^ was u.,^^-.- •-'•ni'^ zOOJ. (P. 
2 2 h ) i ui its dissolution, Tower had faileo *o 
pay withholding tax for the second, • : •. n 
quaiLej v t 226.) The amount owed in withholding 
tax from the filed returns was
 vl-/ - - - —• 43-
,owe: - led equally vw •hree individuals: 
Brett IN. Cherry, Ken Steckelberg, and Erio Stevens« >n
 (  I 11 • • 
Appellant /D ..•. •! 237.) Stevenson was the 
'^ cr^ < - *-v 'Treasurer of the corporation. /-n 
5 
Stevenson held another full-time job, and was not involved 
in the day-to-day operations of Tower; however, Stevenson 
had the sole authority to sign checks for Tower. (R. 227, 
231, 238, 265.) Each month Stevenson would receive a stack 
of checks to sign from the bookkeeper, and Stevenson would 
sign the stack of checks without requesting supporting 
documentation. (R. 243, 244, 265.) Stevenson had signed 
the checks that paid the withholding taxes for 1999 and the 
first quarter of 2000. (R. 55, 56, 265, 266.) Although 
Stevenson did not review any financial records, Tower's 
President, Ken Steckelberg, told Stevenson that Tower's 
finances were being managed appropriately. (R. 227, 228, 
241-243.) In late November 2000, after hearing from third 
parties that Tower may not be meeting all of its financial 
obligations, Stevenson made an unannounced visit to Tower's 
place of business to review the financial records. (R. 228, 
245-248.) During this investigation, Stevenson learned that 
Tower was delinquent in its obligation of withholding tax in 
the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2000. (R. 228, 
248.) Upon learning of the true financial status of Tower, 
6 
Stevenson immediately closeo L;_ •> •. . -T.r,.?r* , fired 
t.-.„ - vii"--:r«"_:, '- r-prided tha" T^wer dissolve, and began the 
winding up process. (R. 228, ^ 8 , 2<*J., 
receive pay..i*-n\ ' • ,T " •' ications, orf of Towei . 
clients, Stevenson used personal funds «v^ . - .' 
purchase C]UJLIUS :. ..t.. '^'actors and suppliers 
4 }
'-ii were owed money oy Tower for work completed. , 
253- 258.) Upon +"he purcnci. •"* :\r, XO 
• or • . j Lntii paid $83,211.4 1 •-w -J • fowe^ II1. '.if, 
230.) By way of an agreement G - L L n.' , °P''l, 
£:t;t: . :- . ' s nvrr.ent from XO t' be paio directly 
to the Bank of Utah -whicn iiau a securtiu r . • ~h 
Stevenson wa^ <-J personal guarantor) 'F ?~0) instead of the 
state to satisfy the past due withhuxuxng Laxe^. "' ' " '^-'l'1, 
259, ^K , , _ .: . ,,l l i', v to Bank :* ntah 
($83,211.41) won'i have satisfied in ful "' * n^ . jvj 
taxes due ($12, ~" ' -4 on Ma' _ , 
2002, i he Commission notified Stevenson c : a preliminary 
assessment of a personal non-paymei i \. penalty. (R. 43.) A 
. ; J L . • • • assessment in the amount of 
$12,018.04 was sent on July 12, 2002. (R. 43-47.) On 
August 9, 2002 Stevenson filed a Petition for 
Redetermination, requesting a hearing on this matter. (R. 
215- 216.) On August 5, 2003 there was a Formal Hearing 
before the Utah State Tax Commission. (R. 3-9.) On August 
18, 2003 the Utah State Tax Commission issued its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision in which 
Petitioner was found to be a responsible party for paying 
over the tax, and that Petitioner willfully failed to pay 
over the withholding tax. (R. 3-9.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302 (2) (20*00) states that the 
individual responsible for collecting and turning over 
withholding tax can be assessed a personal penalty equal to 
the amount of the tax unpaid if the individual acted 
willfully in failing to do so. Stevenson was a responsible 
person for paying over the tax and he willfully failed to do 
so. Stevenson has conceded that he is the responsible 
person under § 59-1-302(2) (2000) (Petitioner's Brief pp. 3, 
6) . Once the individual is found to be the responsible 
8 
p e l b u i i M M 1 U.I I " I i > «1 | • i * I shifts to the indivi dual to 
prove he/she did net c^t wiJlfuZly. Section L» . . . 
sets tui:;, ..±e;u^.i evidence for Wo.iii^ .1 
conduct, and Stevenson is willfully liable under one or ^ 
of these: 
1- Stevenson made a voluntary, conscious, and 
intentional decision to prefer othei uieuimis ever tree 
state government or utilize the tax money for personal 
purposes. After knowing of th^ fax u^xjiq, ~--\> ' * • - :^ 
Lc.i -j pt:.^u * • : .rchase claims from subcontractors 
that were holding up a payment from XO Communications 
Tower Hnor -,. -:. -r-merit i '/ XO, Stevenson 
directed the funds r he paid directly to sank rf Utah, 
instead oi te : e^ .iu. *T:aent would 
have satisfied the delinquency to the State : :^:ln . 
2- Stevenson recklessly disregarded y^wpus . . ..newn 
risks, .-,:..• : resulted in the failure to collect, account 
for, or pay over the tax. As tne L-~J-^L- _. ..to. . -
.
 vr- • '•-u.ri' necking accounts, Stevenson haa a 
duty tu be informed of the financial situation o: :. ;I<L 
9 
corporation. By not taking reasonable measures to ensure 
the taxes were being paid, Stevenson recklessly disregarded 
an obvious risk which resulted in a failure to pay over the 
tax. Stevenson was given, and knew he was given, the only 
signing authority for the corporation. By never 
investigating what he was signing, by not keeping up on the 
financial status of the corporation, and by relying solely 
on the word of Mr. Steckelberg, whom Stevenson knew had 
declared bankruptcy (R. 285) in the past, Stevenson acted 
recklessly. This recklessness resulted in a failure to pay 
the taxes. 
3- Stevenson failed to investigate or to correct 
mismanagement, having notice that the tax was not or is not 
being collected, accounted for, or paid over as provided by 
law. Stevenson was on constructive notice that the taxes 
were not being paid. As the Secretary/Treasurer of the 
corporation, Stevenson had an affirmative duty to 
investigate and correct tax non-payment. Stevenson had paid 
the previous withholding taxes in 1999 and the first quarter 
of 2000. As the sole signatory for the company, Stevenson 
10 
'JMOUJ'J li WK-J knov'ii ii t I i he wasn't signing the checks 
pay the taxes, that no cnt was paying the taxes, 
t^ investigate . " -•• ."inement once he had 
constructive notice that Tower was not paying the 
withholding taxes, Sz^\^L:- . >' • <— ± of 
vainess. 
Stevenson took no eii.r , i* •• • ' *. - j tax 
funds whi. .]*"' having a fiduciary duty ic ic . In oiaer for 
the reasonable cause defense to appl \ , -i • • . - { . . , , 
person HILLS! t ,LV^ rpasonable efforts to protect the funds, 
and then those efforts must be frustrate , y o n , .•... Jice::..; 
outside »• it 1J.IL, < - »- r • ''•*•*• on iias failed t<~> show that 
he took any effort to protect t no funds, a~d albo n^s ;^_- . 
to show that any efi n irustrated JJJ 
circumstances outside of his control. Therefore, 
Stevenson/s reasonable n . i* L • .1. 
Finally, Stevenson has failed to properly marshal the 
evidence used by the commiscicn a. :tu.i.> ., "' - l ' •) 
of I.lit- Utah Huh-s nf Appellate Procedures. Thi s failure to 
marshal the evidence h\ Itself may be i a t ^ i. _. -_, 
11 
appeal. In addition, this Court is required to give 
deference to the Tax Commission's findings on factual issues 
according to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610. The issue of 
willfulness is a factual question. Because the Commission's 
findings of fact were based on substantial evidence and were 
not erroneous, this Court must sustain the Commission's 
finding that Stevenson acted willfully under § 59-1-
302 (2) (2000) . Therefore, the Commission's imposition of the 
personal penalty was appropriate should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PERSONAL PENALTY ASSESSMENT AGAINST STEVENSON 
IS PROPER BECAUSE HE IS A "RESPONSIBLE PERSON" 
REQUIRED TO COLLECT, ACCOUNT FOR, AND PAY OVER 
THE WITHHOLDING TAX AND BECAUSE HE WILLFULLY 
FAILED TO DO SO. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-302(2) states: 
Any person required to collect, truthfully account 
for, and pay over any tax listed in Subsection (1) 
who willfully fails to collect the tax, fails to 
truthfully account for and pay over the tax, or 
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax 
or the payment of the tax, shall be liable for a 
penalty equal to the total amount of the tax 
evaded, not collected, not accounted for, or not 
paid over. 
Because Utah cases are limited, we look to the Federal 
12 
•^ oae iu: . : " :• • U.S.C.A. §6672 has essentially 
the same languar:*. a: Utah Coae §59-1-302 (, . I_J cases 
dealing with §t>. .- t •...-.. ^  * hdt uiit person 
assessed the personal penalty is n ''responsible person " 
That means they are a perse;. -•Jl-. • .- -- account 
for and pay over the withholding tax. Once i t ::. 
established the person is a responsible ^< i son t h^ hurden 
of proof h^|-i<. • liie taxpayer then must show that they 
did not act willtuliy in failing to colled, cic^ .-uiil 
pay ove ':. i - e d States, 3 F. 3d 1 :r t\ 1381 
(10th C • r. 19 93) . In an effort to move away from .. .  
liability tor the iesponsib.1 t;:" pet soi i, the 10th Circuit does 
recognize a reasonable cause defense. This defense is 
"limited to those circumstances wlu. i- I I I I he taxpayer has 
made reasonable efforts to orotect the MI .st lunas, but (2) 
those efforts have been fr-^ ^^ i :•.».. .-.-*--r^ e. outside 
I Mr- taxpayer';-, control." Finley v. U.S. , 123 F.3d 1342, 
1348 (10th Cir. 1997) . 
13 
A. Stevenson, as One-third Owner and 
Secretary/Treasurer, is a Responsible Person 
Because He Had the Authority to Control Tower's 
Finances, and Because He Was the Sole Authorized 
Signatory On All Tower's Checks. 
The 10th Circuit has held that an individual is a 
"responsible person" under §6672 if the individual "has 
significant, though not exclusive, authority in the general 
management and fiscal decision making of the corporation." 
Taylor v. Internal Revenue Service, 69 F.3d 411, 416 (10th 
Cir. 1995) (quoting Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029, 
1032 (10th Cir. 1993)). The Taylor court then states a 
"non-exclusive list of factors demonstrating an indicia of 
responsibility... specifically, we examine whether the 
person: (1) held corporate office; (2) controlled financial 
affairs; (3) had authority to disburse corporate funds; (4) 
owned stock; and (5) had the ability to hire and fire 
employees." .Id. Stevenson was a one-third shareholder in 
the company. (R. 226, 228, 231, 237.) Stevenson was the 
Secretary/ Treasurer and was the only authorized person to 
sign checks for the company. (R. 227, 231, 238, 265.) He 
regularly signed checks each month. (R. 243, 244, 265.) 
14 
m h
^ Tavlc i - O U I L declared tha- .7 tn- taxpayer "possess [es] 
sufficient indicia of respons^L^iii'. • * .-: ^ 
person under §6t.7lJ r^qardlesb L " " : whether ;.^ : x_, :.as the 
final say as to which creditors should be paid, ^r 
the specific job v; ^rate structure to r ^ that 
the taxes are paid over to iiic government." Id. The l 
Circuit continues, ' • . . . -.'.-Cher the 
person had the actual authority or abilit* in view of his 
status within the corporation, in jii( iii» i r-'^*- nwrn." 
St-p-vpr,,- r r .; status as the sole signatory cf the checks and 
as the Secretary/Treasurer demonstrate tJh_ _ :^ : , 
aci : . • .* - - • * * :• - + ! • + ^es owed to the 
state and that he possesses "sufficient u ^ U x a of 
respoiu.. . . • Tit lui and ra v --e- Mie 
company's withholdinq taxes. because Stevensc:. ..^ ^ ;.,,e 
authority u:_ . . taxes, Stevenson is a 
"responsible person" under the statute. Though undisputed 
(Appellant's Brief at i , „ II "Lit i is 
signi f i cant. 
15 
B. Stevenson Willfully Failed To Collect, Account 
For, or Pay Over The Withholding Tax When He 
Intentionally and Voluntarily Preferred Other 
Creditors Over the State and When He 
Recklessly Disregarded an Obvious Risk that 
Resulted in Nonpayment of the Tax. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302 (7) (b), Stevenson 
willfully failed to collect, account for, and pay over the 
tax because (a) he used personal funds to resolve claims 
against Tower without first paying the delinquent tax, he 
intentionally directed more than $80,000 collected from XO 
be paid to Bank of Utah instead of the State after being 
made aware of the tax delinquency, (R. 38-42, 230, 259, 260) 
(b) he recklessly disregarded an obvious risk which resulted 
in a failure to pay the tax when he ignored the absence of 
payments for withholding tax, and (c) he failed to 
investigate and correct the mismanagement when he neglected 
to inquire about the lack of mandatory tax payments. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7)(b) states: 
It is prima facie evidence that a person has 
willfully failed to collect, truthfully account 
for, or pay over any of the taxes ... if the 
commission or a court finds that the person 
charged with the responsibility of collecting, 
accounting for, or paying over the taxes: 
16 
(I) made a voluntary, conscious, and 
intentional decision to prefer other 
creditors over the state government or 
utilize the tax money for personal 
purposes; 
(ii) recklessly disregarded obvious •-.: 
known risks, which resulted in the 
failure to collect, account for, -r ' 
over the tax * --^  
(iii) failed t:c investigate or to correct 
mismanagement, having notice that the tax 
was not or is not being collected, 
accounted f o*r - ~ r paid over as provided 
by law. 
Only one prong c* . • . . * - -.i< * be 
met. '-vpn>rr meets all three; and the C-urt should uphold 
the Tax Commission's finding of a^unuc^i :.!,.;. :,.;,:i.. 
ev-_i*':. i.ev^ ': r '• ^ .-i^ ri,Tments to creditors instead of 
payina Lhe delinquent witnholding tax . :j.:.«jb., .. s 
preseni ..n-_ir- * ^ • • person "acts or fails to act 
consciously and voluntarily and with knowledge or i:.i^ ;_ 
that as a resuli ' . ii. m ? j«.if. :-tion trust funds 
belonging Lw the government will net oe p~id over but w 
be used for other purposes.' I-IW • quoting 
Olsen K United States, 952 F.2d 236, 240 (8t!1 Cir. 1-9V* 
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Upon discovering an unpaid tax, it is the duty of a 
responsible person "to apply unencumbered corporate funds to 
pay the tax liabilities for the ... delinquent quarters as 
well as any future quarters.'' Jd. According to Sorenson v. 
United States, unencumbered corporate funds will consist of 
any personal funds either loaned to the corporation or used 
for corporate purposes. 521 F. 2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(stating "[t]he use to which the funds were put, Viz. the 
payment of corporate obligations, transformed [the 
taxpayer's] personal funds into funds of the corporation"). 
Failure by a responsible person to pay the tax while 
continuing to pay other creditors will result in a personal 
non-payment assessment against the responsible person. 
Stauffer v. United States, 1998 WL 681478, at *1 (D. Colo. 
Aug. 27, 1998), 82 A.F.T.R. 2d 98-6204. Additionally, "the 
willfulness requirement is met if there is evidence that the 
responsible officer had knowledge of payments to other 
creditors after he was aware of the failure to remit the 
withheld taxes." Thibodeau v. US, 828 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th 
Cir. 1987) quoting Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 
IS 
] ' ^ - • •'' 
When Stevenson intentionally and a^iii-.-iateiy p-j..; 
other cred-i. •_'._:..:
 ;;:-m.: ' •'• -:;JOII lcarnino "-f >;he tax 
delinquency he me' willfulness. Stevenson has iijci^aieu 
that he used nearly -u 'resolve 
claims against Tower in order to facilitate m e recovery of 
the company's accounts receivaL : u : .- . : * 
fi^-t-r -
 :-y secured creditor at £b . } By doing 
so, Stevenson used personal m ^ ^ m i : ii- , -:;*•: •' , 
t,..., . ; \ 5 ^ : - • e luiiua -Liito corpora + e funds. 
Sorenson, 521 F.2d at Z?J . The statute dictates m - . •„-=< I 
those new] .• v ! iub to > creaitc rs ahead 
of the State constitutes prima, facie evidence, that Stevensoi 1 
wiJltully tailed " . <.d.U'Cl, a^ondi1 ' ', and r v over the 
taxes. 
A taxpayer viulates Lhe i.Ldtu1, " hoos'nq t? pit/ 
credi tors other than [the .state] with knowledge of m e tax 
delinquency." Hammon v. L.^ . 
S'tevt-jiu iun becamp a w ^ e oi m e Lax delinquency November of 
2000 (R. 248.) After being made aware -^ .._ ^-..
 :-- . y, 
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Stevenson then made an agreement with XO to pay a claim owed 
by Tower directly to Bank of Utah (R. R.39-42, 259- 62.) 
This is similar to the facts in a 1995 10th Circuit case, 
Bradshaw v. United States, 83 F.3d 1175, 1183 quoting Kalb 
v. United States, 505 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 1974) in which 
the personal penalty was upheld against an officer in a 
closely held corporation, because the officer "not only knew 
of but negotiated the arrangement with the bank under which 
other creditors were preferred to the government...while 
knowing that withholding taxes were not being paid." Just 
like in Bradshaw, Stevenson knew that his company had not 
paid the withholding taxes when he made the arrangement to 
direct the XO funds directly to Bank of Utah. (R. 247, 251, 
253, 259-264.) By making the arrangement to have XO pay 
funds owed to Tower directly to Bank of Utah instead of to 
the State to satisfy the delinquent tax, after being made 
aware of the tax delinquency, Stevenson intentionally 
preferred a creditor over the State. Under Hammon and 
Bradshaw, this preference is a willful violation of the 
Statute. Choosing to pay another creditor ahead of the 
20 
state is also pr:i i na faci e evi dence of \ ;i ] ] fi i] ] y failing to 
collect, account b-;?
 t"ind p a w r ver the taxer under the 
Statute. Utah Code /in;.. 
Additionally, this Court should upholc the Tax 
Commission's finding of suiii.c:cM pi.::.j • > :.* • z 
Stevens-'i, i will* .diled Lu collect, a c m u r " for., ar. u v^\ 
over the withholding tax when he reckless! aisregaiat J 
O;JV..O!..,. • • • r:"" w - r m a y b e d e l i n q u e n t ^. 
tax obligations to the State, and that he failed to 
investigate w I i e 11 1 e i S t ecke 1 b e r g wa s a de q i i a t e ] y ma naming the 
company's financial affairs. In Hammon, the court he^d that 
a "showing of reci.ici: J.JILJJ. • .. ' • •" ~e 01 
tr.rpe elements: (x; LO-- responsible person's knowledge (or 
reason to know) of a i.isk tnut: taxes \ i I I 
reasons * onpcriuiiity io discover and remedy the problem, 
and (3) a failure to undertake the reasorir.^o c- i ;
 : 
€:.. ui>-
 P o riammc- _ United States, 21 C I . Ct. f 
29-30 (CI. Ct. lr-rr 
Stevenson :;-.:.. ~of ±n showing 
that he did not disregard a known or rovi* us risk that the 
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taxes would not be paid or that he did not fail to 
investigate Tower's financial condition. Stevenson's 
actions satisfy the first element of reckless disregard as 
stated in Hammon when Stevenson was (or should have been) 
aware of an obvious risk that Steckelberg was not remitting 
the trust funds to the State. Stevenson has acknowledged 
that he possessed sole authority to sign checks drawn on 
Tower's business account, and as such, he actually signed 
and processed checks "as directed by Mr. Steckleberg." 
Appellant's Brief at 2-3. Therefore, whether Stevenson 
received documentation regarding the checks he processed or 
not, he was able to observe the different payments made to 
Tower's creditors and the complete lack of any payments made 
to the State for withholding tax for the last three quarters 
of 2000. This should have indicated to Stevenson that there 
was an obvious risk that the trust funds were not protected. 
This contradicts Stevenson's indication that he was not 
responsible for, and did not have access to, "accounts or 
obligations for which payments were made."' 
Additionally, Stevenson satisfies the second Hammon 
22 
element .,.;,._ :.. ' •- 'he 
opportunity to discover and remedy the delinquency. As a 
partial owner and Secretary-Trici^uiLi, _, L- :i..- : 
rpa.sonnble ^roortunity to discover that Tower was delinquent 
. .- - ts payments :f the withholding tax by merely reviewing 
•• -
 r
 -.-•- ^s the sole authorized 
signatory, he also had the authority to remedy the 
i^ -i.-^ '. :- -
 t , . -*r . . r • ne State. However, 
for several months, Stevenson neglected t undertake any 
extorts to ensure payt.t. 
Steckelberg about the company's overall finances anci 
operations. 
Lastly, Stevenson satisfies the third element of Hammon 
when Stevenson did not make any reasonable efforts Lu ensure 
payment - r-rsonal knowledge Stevenson had about 
the absence of payments to the State, unreasonable for 
Steven:"* »n I Iis,,vvjv'1 ' '• •' " r,^v:ledcfe and instead rely on 
Steckelberg's misrepresentations. .herefore, Stevenson's 
disregard of ai :i - - . r «r/" i i< : t have been 
oa:^, coupled wit;* ;*is failure Lo further investigate, is 
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prima facie evidence that he willfully failed to collect, 
account for, and pay over the tax. Case law clarifies the 
affirmative duty of Stevenson: "[Appellant] cannot escape 
liability by claiming that he relied on the assurances of 
others." Denbo at 1033,1034. Referencing Denbo at 988 F.2d 
1034 quoting Hornsby v. Internal Revenue Service/ 588 F.2d 
952, 953 (5th Cir. 1979) ("A fiduciary cannot absolve 
himself merely by disregarding his duty and leaving to 
someone else to discharge.") and Denbo at 1034 quoting 
Hartman, 538 F.2d at 1344-45 ("Taxpayer's failure to see to 
it that withholding taxes were paid was willful despite that 
his office as president was merely titular.") 
"The primary focus of the willfulness test is the 
taxpayer's diligence in attending to the duty to pay 
employment taxes. By undertaking all reasonable efforts to 
fulfill that duty, taxpayers can show that they did not 
willfully neglect their obligations under §6672." Hammon v. 
U.S. 21 Cl.Ct. 14 at 27 (quoting Feist v. United States, 221 
Cl.Ct. 531, 542, 607 F.2d 954, 961 (1979)). 
"The willfulness requirement is also met if the 
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responsible otiicui :-.11 : ",l r^ck less disregard of a known 
or obvious risk rV~<i *rust funds may be remitted to the 
government ' " Thiioodeau, . . . 'ewsome) . 
THE REASONABLE CAUSE DEFENSE SHOULD FAIL BECAUSE 
STEVENSON HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE TOOK 
REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE TRUST FUNDS AND 
THAT THOSE EFFORTS WERE THEN FRUSTRATED BY 
CIRCUMSTANCES OUTSIDE OF HIS CONTROL. 
Because Stevenson failed to demonstrate reasonable 
cause as to why he was unable t
 t . -r 
Srf-;^r.° • correctly assessed and the 1 inal Decision was 
correct : n affirming a personal non-pcc.i:^  .... 
C o d ^ / \ i in ii! r ciq 1 11 • '1 rid ( fi) c l a r i f i e s the t rus t fund nature of 
withholding tax: 
Each employer who deducts and withholds any amount 
under this part shall hold the amount in trust for 
the State of Utah for the payment of it to the 
• Commission in the manner and at the ti me provi ded 
for i n t h i s p a r t. 
The Tenth Circui- has recognized a reasonable cause defense 
to the assessment or ^  p^i- .• . r>~z- '^ " .---*•
 Lul_ 
responsible persons who were unable to ensure payment of the 
withholding tax. Specifica1 1 w the c^ it.. -
in^tdii' e^ whe * " ^ lyraver has made reasonable 
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efforts to protect the trust funds, but (2) those efforts 
have been frustrated by circumstances outside the taxpayer's 
control." Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342, 1348 
(10th Cir. 1997). In Finley, the court ruled that the 
taxpayer may have had a reasonable cause defense to his 
failure to pay withholding tax when he instructed his bank 
to apply funds to the tax balance, but the bank refused, 
instead applying funds to a loan it held. Id. The court 
reasoned that by allowing the taxpayer to assert the 
reasonable cause defense, the court was able to "preserve[] 
a role for the jury to determine whether, based on all 
relevant evidence in a particular case, the responsible 
taxpayer's conduct reflects the requisite scienter." Id. 
This Court should affirm the Final Decision against 
Stevenson because he has failed to show that he satisfies 
the requirements of the reasonable cause defense. First, 
Stevenson has not demonstrated that he made any reasonable 
efforts to protect the trust funds. To the contrary, 
Stevenson ignored all warning signs which indicated that the 
trust funds were in jeopardy, such as the complete lack of 
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withholding tax payments to the State, and he unreasonably 
relied on Steckeioerg' - leprebe;:.^; • ... ' ; • * '•'•••: -
I .+. ^ v<..^rrn ^^ make reasonable efforts to protect the 
trust tunas, he fails to satisiy the secon oi-. > 
reasons : ~ •..-.:.. < f^ -; sf: when he possessed the authority to 
discover and remedy the delinquency. Stevenson cia^:.: •..;.-••_ 
hi.. ciLL-n;L • - . < . • • , - v i inauer -y was hampered by 
Steckelbera's i; ..^representations. howevei , as one-tnira 
owner ana oeciLL.;^ .1*1:. •..-..-^  . 1 i the authority 
and obligation L~ confirm *^ : disprove Stec xelberq' s 
representations. Stevenson'^ L ,-. : • = ts: • : - r • * > 
r^*. : •".-" r :ie financial records in December of 2000, 
illustrates that if he wou±u have taxen L .1 .. 
ea.-Zi-c Lnose actions would tave been equally 
successfu. Therefore, Stevenson has lai.ea to ;_ 
1 ) i s rec: k] ess di srega 1:d c f an obvious risk that the tax w c, u _ d 
not be oaid qualifies tor a reasonable cause defense. 
h u o , O...V-.- . _ uiie reasonable 
cause defense f^r w* '•fullv failina to ensure the collection 
and payment o^ ^ ,.iiu^x_., 
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creditors ahead of the State. No third party intervened in 
blocking Stevenson's ability to remit those funds to the 
State of Utah. Therefore, Stevenson's decision to use those 
personal funds to purchase the claims of creditors other 
than Bank of Utah, rather than to pay the withholding tax, 
is not excused by the reasonable cause defense. 
Stevenson's inaction in protecting the trust funds does 
not meet the necessary standard of reasonableness when his 
only effort regarding the trust funds was to occasionally 
ask Steckelberg how the company was doing. While it is true 
that Stevenson was not involved in the day-to-day operations 
of Tower, he was the sole authorized signatory on the 
company's checking account and an officer. As such, he owed 
a duty to oversee the financials of the company. Stevenson 
did not meet this duty. Stevenson admits that he never paid 
any attention to what he was signing, and did not request to 
see the books of the company until after he had heard rumors 
that Tower was not meeting its' financial obligations. 
These actions are not adequate to ensure that trust funds 
are turned over to the government. 
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III. THE COURT MUST GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE TAX 
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUDING THAT 
STEVENSON WILLFULLY FAILED TO PAY OVER THE 
WITHHOLDING TAX SUCH THAT THE PERSONAL PENALTY 
WAS PROPERLY ASSESSED UNDER THE STATUTE. 
** The Tax Commission' s Findings of Fact were 
Based on Substantial Evidence and the Failure 
of the Petitioner to Marshal Evidence to the 
Contrary Requires this Court to Sustain the 
Tax Commission's Final Decision. 
This Court: :.:-^ ^
 v -^j-_r • iax Commission 
* ' Jb finding +h^ t- Stevenson acted williuily i n failing to 
pay over the wiLniiuj.uxiiM' tax- ° r Q 1-610.) 
Under the "substantial evidence" test, the Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-610 (2000), states the reviewing ...nil -. 11.. I I 
v
" . .i. .- : "iference concerninn its written 
findinns of fact, applying a substantial c-laence ^ a. J^IJ." 
xx
^uDSLj./.idJ i" mlencc ' i t 11 ii quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reusuu.,'! 
mind to support a ! . . ^st: National Bank of Boston 
v. County Bd. Of Equalization of Salt Lake Countx, ,.^d 
1163 (Utah 1992).
 k ^ star/.i^. > :^ -• than a mere 
\srintill.i t: evidence... Lhough 'something less than the 
29 
weight of the evidence.'" (Citations omitted.) Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989). 
The "substantial evidence" test requires review of the 
whole record, including evidence that both supports the 
agency's factual findings and evidence that fairly detracts 
from the weight of the evidence. Id. at 68. This does not 
mean that this Court need grant equal weight to all the 
evidence. Ouestar Pipeline Company v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1993). In the past, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that the "substantial evidence" test 
"requires us to uphold an agency's factual findings if such 
findings are supported by substantial evidence." Zissi v. 
State Tax Commission of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992). 
Rule 24(a) (9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(Supp. 1999) states, "A party challenging a fact finding 
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Stevenson has failed to marshal the 
fact evidence challenging his position. The burden of proof 
lies with the party appealing the administrative order. Id. 
at 852. The challenging party must "marshal all of the 
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evidence s^ \. . v unau despite the 
supporting facts anc. . ; qr * the conflicting 
contradictory ev,aence, t. . . * - u*--
. r-tantial evidence.'' Grace Drilling; ." * P. 2d at: bb . 
"This Court has held that: 
Successful challenges to findings <. f : , *r. thus 
must demonstrate to appellate courts first how the 
trial court found the facts from the evidence and 
second why such findings contradict the weight of 
the evidence. 
Oneida/SLC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 8 72 
., ), -scribing Lhe 
responsibility cf the challenger this Court noted: 
In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must 
present in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that 
the court's finding resting upon the evidence is 
clearly erroneous. (Emphasis added.) 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment ^ . , 
1 "< ! " i || '001). The Petitioner has failed to marshal 
the evidence in accordance with these decisions. 
B. Because the Issue of Willfulness is a Question of 
Fact, This Court Must Give Deference to the 
Commission's Finding that Stevenson Acted 
Willfully in Not Paying Over the Withholding Tax. 
The U.S. 10th Circuit Court has recognized that the 
issue of willfulness is a question of fact. (See Bradshaw 
v. U.S., 83 F. 3d 1175, 1183; Taylor, 69 F. 3d at 417-18; 
and Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033) . Therefore, this Court must 
give deference to the Tax Commission in it's finding that 
Stevenson acted willfully in failing to pay over the 
withholding tax. The Findings of Fact by the Tax Commission 
in it's Final Decision, even if not sufficiently marshaled 
by the Petitioner in it's brief, easily meets the 
substantial evidence standard. (See Addendum A.) Thus, the 
Tax Commission correctly concluded, "As an officer of the 
company and the sole signer on Tower's checks, Petitioner 
had a duty to investigate the situation as it developed and 
attempt to correct the problem. Rather than fulfill this 
duty, Petitioner recklessly chose to remain unaware of the 
problem. Such reckless disregard of an obvious risk that 
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withholding taxes were noi bh*iiM prinl iK'moiu,tidt ^ d 
^^'••iontii's willful failure to pay over Tower's withholding 
taxes." '~ '*- n ) 
CONCLUSION 
•onclusion, Stevenson, as a responsxLue person 
proper^ _. _.L-^y^-u r-rivmen4" oenalty because he 
w_i - ; fur: j - f ai ] ed to collect, account tor , ~r pay over the 
withnoxvj^ixJ LJX '..:..:. ..•_ \ :.^:-...ii--:: "' ;"J"ors ovei the 
State, he recklessly disregarded an obvious risk that the 
tax would not be paid, and I ie fai 1 e :i t : i i : estigate : J : 
''^'^.aoement. Stevenson's defense of reasonable 
cause should fa: 1 because he oiu n^L ciiie;:^ . . 
.cd::n;j ;o ...•-*--.- •
 : -r-tect the trust fund- and, assuming 
arguendo that he made such efforts, those u t i c n s w^ :_ 
^^^jLi-i-t- r.":^  + :: - '^"ond his conirol. 
Addit ionallv, because willfulness is a question oi :a.:, 
tin J u . i i :uu_. ,-Mrer.c« ommissions finding 
that Stevenson acted willfully. Stevenson also failed to 
properly marshal :he evidence . 
'".'.onimis" ; ""•r- * J ~ T TS were not substantially supported by the 
evidence. 
The Final Decision of the Tax Commission should be 
sustained in its entlx^y. 
day of October, 2004 DATED thi is 7-
GALE K / FRANCIS / 
Assistant Attorney General 
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